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L Introduction
By specifying when one person is subject to the legal
consequences of another's conduct, the common law of agency
serves as a bridge to the application of other legal doctrines,
including the defense of in pari delicto.' Its bridging function
implicates agency law in a wide range of disputes involving
disparate bodies of primary law, including the tort and contract
doctrines relevant to professional malpractice cases. Christine
Shepard's Note, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto
Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach2 ably
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I
served as the Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of
Agency, published in final form in 2006. I was also an amicus curiae and an
author of the brief submitted on behalf of myself and other amici in Kirschner v.
KPMG LLP, a case discussed in this Article.
1. This is shorthand for the Latin maxim, in pari delicto potior est
condition defendentis, translated as "[w]here both parties are equally in the
wrong, the position of the defendant is stronger." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, app.
B, at 1838 (9th ed. 2009).
2. Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari Delicto
Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
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examines several recent cases that are sharply divided on the
implications of agency doctrine for defenses available in such
cases, in particular when auditors are defendants. 3 Shepard
focuses on recent cases stemming from auditors' failure to detect
or report fraud perpetrated by a corporation's agents, typically,
but not necessarily, situated high within the corporation's
management hierarchy, through manipulation of the
corporation's financial records. She argues that courts should
decouple the operation of agency doctrines that charge a
corporation with the legal consequences of its agents' wrongdoing,
including their knowledge of their own fraud, from a separate
determination of whether the doctrine of in pari delicto should
bar recovery, whether by the corporation itself, its shareholders
suing derivatively on its behalf, a trustee in bankruptcy, or a
litigation trust or committee created to pursue claims following
bankruptcy. Only when a corporation is itself directly at fault
should in pari delicto apply. Shepard's proposal is grounded in
the insight-with which I agree-that the broad reach of agency
doctrine does not mean that it necessarily answers all questions
arising from a dispute. Moreover, as Shepard explains, agency
doctrines of attribution and imputation operate on an all-or-
nothing basis that disallows consideration of relative fault or
responsibility. I begin with some background and then turn to
questions beyond those examined in Shepard's Note. These
include the functions served by auditors, in particular in
companies with public shareholders, and the significance of
choice of law. I conclude with some reservations about
implementing the approach Shepard recommends and about the
capacity of private law to resolve the underlying issues.
275 (2012).
3. Although Shepard's Note is focused on auditors as defendants, the
question is salient for other categories of external providers of professional
services, including lawyers. See Henry S. Bryans, Claims Against Lawyers By
Bankruptcy Trustees-A First Course on the In Pari Delicto Defense, 66 Bus.
LAW. 587 (2011) (discussing lawyers' use of the in pari delicto defense when
trustees bring claims against them based on legal services provided to a debtor
prior to bankruptcy).
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II. Agency Law and Defenses to Professional Malpractice
Agency law and the legal doctrines applicable to professional
malpractice intersect in several ways. For starters, agency law
defines when the relationship between two persons situates one as
an agent and the other as the principal.4 In the corporate context,
a corporation's agents include its officers and managerial
employees. Agency doctrines of general applicability also specify
when the legal consequences of an agent's conduct may be
attributed to the principal. When an agent makes a contract
purportedly on behalf of the corporation, attribution turns in most
cases on whether the agent acted with actual and/or apparent
authority.5 An agent's tortious conduct may also be attributed to a
corporate principal with the result that it becomes vicariously
liable to the victim; when the agent is an employee, the long-
established doctrine of respondeat superior determines whether
the principal is vicariously liable. 6 When the agent is not an
employee (or is an employee acting outside the scope of
employment for purposes of respondeat superior), the principal's
vicarious liability for unauthorized tortious conduct turns on
whether the agent's conduct appeared to be authorized, bringing
the issue within the ambit of the doctrine of apparent authority.7
It's helpful to distinguish, as do many but not all cases,
attribution of conduct from imputing an agent's knowledge to the
principal. Whether a principal is charged with knowledge of a fact
known to an agent may carry consequences different from those
that follow attributing the agent's conduct to the principal. For
example, knowledge imputed from an agent to the principal may
prove beneficial to the principal by establishing that action was
taken reasonably when the law requires reasonable action. Or the
consequences for the principal may lead to the imposition of
liability, for example for fraud committed by an agent against a
third party when the underlying definition of the tort-fraudulent
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
5. Id. §§ 2.01, 2.03.
6. Id. § 7.07.
7. Id. § 7.08.
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misrepresentation-requires that the defendant have acted with
scienter. 8
In contrast, Shepard's Note tackles imputation's less intuitive
consequences. Imputing its agents' knowledge of their fraudulent
conduct to a corporation may bar claims it may assert against
third parties who, by failing to detect or by colluding in the agents'
misconduct, breached duties owed to the corporation-duties that
stemmed from either the third party's undertaking to render
professional services or its active collusion in the agents'
fraudulent conduct. Such claims would be barred via in pari delicto
when the court treats the corporation's imputed knowledge as
establishing fault that is substantially the same as the fault of the
third-party service-provider. 9
In the assessment of an experienced observer, the application
of in pari delicto in this context represents "the product of very
skilled advocacy,"10 especially when the plaintiff who seeks to
impose liability is a bankruptcy trustee. This is because the history
of in pari delicto marks it as a doctrine intended to deter
wrongdoing and to guard against the jeopardy to judicial integrity
were a court "required to serve as paymaster of the wages of crime,
or referee between thieves."11 In contrast, a bankruptcy trustee is
innocent, not a potential wrongdoer to be deterred, who pursues
recovery on behalf of innocent creditors. Only through a rigid
application of the "alchemy of imputation"12 could in pari delicto
morph into an affirmative defense-or a matter of standingl 3-to
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977) (defining fraudulent
misrepresentation). One who makes a false statement of fact, opinion, intention
or law does so fraudulently when the maker knows or believes that the matter is
not as represented, lacks confidence in the accuracy of the express or implied
representation, or knows that the representation lacks the stated or implied
basis. Id.
9. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632 (1988) (defining the in pari delicto
defense).
10. Bryans, supra note 3, at 618.
11. Stone v. Freeman, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (N.Y. 1948), quoted in Kirschner
v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010).
12. Bryans, supra note 3, at 619; see also Shepard, supra note 2, at 294
("There is a leap in logic from holding a corporation legally responsible for the
acts of its agent through imputation to classifying it as a wrongdoer who may
not bring a claim before the court").
13. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 120 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that a bankruptcy trustee lacks standing to pursue claims
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be asserted by defendants as of right.14 This alchemical
transformation may rely on another general characteristic of
agency doctrine, which is its binary or "all-or-nothing" quality that
is mirrored by in pari delicto itself. That is, agency doctrines-
including those governing a principal's vicarious liability-either
do or do not result in attribution or imputation, but they do not
turn on the relative culpability of a principal and a third-party
plaintiff or defendant. As Shepard emphasizes, applying in pari
delicto via imputed knowledge ignores the requirement of personal
wrongdoing on which courts long premised the availability of in
pari delicto.15
Additionally, omissions are crucial to the alchemy's success.
Imputation is often justified on the basis that it creates incentives
for principals to exercise care in choosing and monitoring the
agents who represent them in interactions external to the
principal-agent relationship.16 Otherwise, the principal might be
tempted to choose less than scrupulous agents, gambling that their
misconduct against third parties may benefit the principal but that
direct fault on the principal's part will be difficult for a third-party
victim to prove. However, third-party providers of professional
services often are themselves agents of a firm because they are the
firm's employees or (however designated) its owners as
partner/shareholders. A service firm's incentives to exercise care in
choosing and monitoring agents seem as relevant as comparable
incentives within the client's organization.' 7
against third parties alleged to have assisted insiders of debtor in damaging it).
No other federal circuit followed Wagoner in treating in pari delicto as a
standing doctrine; although Wagoner stated that it applied New York law, the
New York Court of Appeals has clarified that Wagoner is not a part of New York
law, in which in pari delicto is an affirmative defense. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d
at 946 n.3 ("[I]n New York, in pari delicto is an affirmative defense, not a matter
of standing.").
14. See Bryans, supra note 3, at 619 (noting that the judge-made doctrine
of in pari delicto which was created to "preserve the integrity of the . .. courts"
has been converted to a defense as of right).
15. See Shepard, supra note 2, at 296 ("[A] corporation's legal responsibility
for the acts of its agents is not identical to the label of 'wrongdoer' which would
invite the in pari delicto defense.").
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) ("Imputation
creates incentives for a principal to choose agents carefully and to use care in
delegating functions to them.").
17. This is not a point addressed in my earlier article on imputation. See
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If ignored, the inescapable fact that most who furnish
professional services in this context are themselves agents of firms
can lead to odd results. In the most recent of the cases that
Shepard discusses, Kirschner v. KPMG LLP,18 the New York Court
of Appeals justified applying in pari delicto to bar claims against,
inter alia, audit firms and a law firm because "why should the
interests of innocent stakeholders of corporate fraudsters trump
those of innocent stakeholders of the outside professionals who are
the defendants"?19 And why depart from the "recognition that
principals, rather than third parties, are best-suited to police their
chosen agents and to make sure that they do not take actions that
ultimately do more harm than good"? 20 As it happens, in
Kirschner, the law firm partner who had lead responsibility for the
client was himself so implicated in senior management's fraud that
he was convicted of federal felonies and sentenced to seven years
in prison. 21 In pari delicto insulated his former law firm from
liability to the trustee of the defunct client's litigation trust, which
excluded the firm's assets (including its insurance resources) from
the pool of assets potentially available to compensate innocent
creditors, notwithstanding the firm's receipt of fees paid by the
client during the fraud and the far-from-inconceivable prospect
that lapses occurred in the law firm's supervision of its partner's
work and clientele. 22
Additionally, it is well established that a client's own
negligence is not a defense to an auditor's negligence unless the
Deborah A. DeMott, When Is a Principal Charged with an Agent's Knowledge, 13
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 291 (2003) (exploring the basics of how the imputation
doctrine operates, discussing the traditional justifications for imputation, and
offering alternate justifications).
18. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010).
19. Id. at 958.
20. Id. at 953.
21. Debra Cassens Weiss, Sentence 'Quite Harsh' for Ex-Mayer Brown
Partner in Refco Fraud, A.B.A. J., Jan. 15, 2010.
22. Nor were the firm and the incarcerated partner subject to liability to
the client's defrauded shareholders because they did not make false statements
directly to shareholders as required for liability under the federal securities
laws. See Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3021 (2011) ("We hold that a secondary actor[,
such as a lawyer or accountant,] can be held liable in a private damages action
brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5(b) only for false statements attributed to the
secondary-actor defendant at the time of dissemination.").
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client's negligence contributed to the auditor's failure to perform
its duties. For example, in National Surety Co. v. Lybrand23 the
defendant auditors failed to detect defalcations by the client's
cashier, allegedly because the auditors did not perform the
examinations-such as comparing bank deposit slips with deposit
entries to verify the client's cash position-that would have
detected the cashier's practice of embezzling from petty cash.24 The
defendants argued that their client itself was contributorily
negligent because the cashier had charge of banking transactions
as well as custody of clients' checks and that the combination
enabled the cashier to disguise his cash thefts. Replied the court,
"[a]ccountants, as we know, are commonly employed for the very
purpose of detecting defalcations which the employer's negligence
has made possible."25 Additionally, the client's allegedly negligent
practices prompted no caution-no warnings-from its auditors.26
The auditors' failure to caution their client in Lybrand
implicates a long-standing expectation and duty of external
auditors to call known deficiencies in internal controls to the
client's attention.27 Auditors also assess the effectiveness of the
client's own internal controls over financial reporting.28 Since the
preparation of financial statements is management's responsibility
(and routine audits are not forensic exercises), an auditor's
representation that financial statements conform to accounting
principles requires comfort with the client's own internal controls
and practices that affect the reliability of its financial reporting
and preparation of financial statements. Modern regulatory
23. Nat'l Sur. Co. v. Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939).
24. Id. at 555-57.
25. Id. at 563.
26. Id. at 559-60 (noting that auditors had not "made any suggestion to
[client] as to their methods relative to cash, yet charge [client] with negligence
in the failure to make investigations which are within the ordinary realm of
professional accountants").
27. See SEC Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 601.01, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 73,251, at 62,896 (CCH 2009) [hereinafter SEC Codification]
("[G]enerally accepted audit standards require auditors to report to their clients
all material weaknesses in internal accounting controls that come to their
attention during an examination of financial statements in accordance with
such standards.").
28. SEC Reg. §210.2-02(f, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 69,126, at 61,020-21 (CCH
2011) (requiring auditors' attestation on internal control over financial
reporting).
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concern with internal controls was sparked by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act,29 which required public companies to "devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls" sufficient, inter
alia, to "maintain accountability for assets."30 The concern
intensified in 2002 when Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 31
required certification by senior management of the effectiveness of
internal controls over financial reporting, 32 augmenting the
already extensive presence of accounting and auditing matters
within federal securities regulation. Thus, although internal
controls are situated within an audit client's organization, external
auditors often design them33 and assess their effectiveness. 34 Put
differently, a client's system of internal controls pertinent to the
accuracy of its financial reporting often stems from an interactive
process that engages the client's organization at many levels,
including the board of directors and its audit committee, with
active involvement from the client's external auditor. And, as
noted above, an auditor has long had a duty to bring known
discrepancies in internal controls to the client's attention. For an
audit firm, work focused on designing and testing internal
controls, as opposed to ferreting out fraud, has been characterized
as "intellectually stimulating and lucrative work,"35 which, for our
purposes, imposes duties on an auditor concerning the client's
internal processes and controls.
The cases discussed by Shepard differ from Lybrand in both
the hierarchical position of the wrongdoer within the firm (cashier-
employee in broker-dealer versus senior management of
corporation) and the consequences or nature of the agent's
29. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
30. Id.; see also Securities Exchange Act § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)
(2006).
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006) (stating the requirement for management
assessment of internal controls).
33. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS 143-45 (2006).
34. See, e.g., PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, http://pcaobus.org/
Standards/Auditing/Pages/AuditingStandard_5.aspx#introduction (last visited
Jan. 26, 2012) (effective pursuant to SEC Release No. 34-56152 (July 27, 1007))
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This standard governs an
external audit of management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal
controls.
35. COFFEE, supra note 33, at 145.
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wrongdoing. Although agency doctrine generally imputes an
agent's knowledge to the principal when it concerns information
related to the agent's duties to the principal, imputation is subject
to an exception when the agent acted "adversely" to the principal. 36
Agents who steal from the principal, as did the cashier in Lybrand,
act beyond the bounds of the agency relationship.37 Whether an
agent's fraud should be characterized as sufficiently adverse to the
principal for purposes of imputing the agent's knowledge is a vexed
question that cases do not answer consistently. In the interests of
clarity, however, whether an agent acted adversely to the principal
is best treated as a step toward determining whether the agent's
knowledge should be imputed to the principal, not as an exception
to the availability of in pari delicto as a defense. 38
III. The Sharp Bite of Choice of Law
A remarkable feature of the cases Shepard discusses is that,
within a short period of time, three important jurisdictions-New
Jersey,39 New York,40 and Pennsylvania 4 1-adopted three very
different rules. Moreover, a lengthy dictum from Delaware's Court
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (2006).
37. Id. cmt. c (discussing when an agent acts adversely to a principal).
38. Accord, In re AMERCO Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 695 n.5 (Nev.
2011) ("[W]e conclude that the appropriate analysis requires courts to consider
the adverse interest exception as a means of rebutting the presumption that an
agent's acts are imputed to the corporation."); Shepard, supra note 2, at 316. But
see Am. Int'l Grp. Consol. Derivative Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 891 n.50 (Del. Ch.
2009) ("[R]egardless of whether the adverse interest exception is seen as an
exception to in pari delicto or to imputation, the effect is the same.").
39. See NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 873 (N.J. 2006)
(holding that the imputation doctrine does not bar corporate shareholders from
recovering through a litigation trust against an auditor who was negligent in
failing to uncover the fraud of corporate officers or directors).
40. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010) (holding
that the doctrine of in pari delicto will bar a derivative claim under New York
law when a corporation sues its outside auditor for professional malpractice or
negligence in failing to detect fraud committed by the corporation).
41. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ.
& Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 339 (Pa.
2010) (holding that Pennsylvania will recognize the in pari delicto defense in the
negligent-auditor context, but that imputation is unavailable to an auditor who
has not proceeded in material good faith by colluding with the agent to
fraudulently misstate corporate finances).
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of Chancery in a case governed by New York law recommends yet
another approach. 42 Beyond the fact that all four jurisdictions
share geographical proximity, such striking diversity in recently
articulated rules seems unusual. One explanation may be not just
high stakes for the parties, but the fact that plausible policy
arguments do not all point in the same direction. Audit firms
confront potentially crippling monetary liability in amounts
disproportionate to fees that clients pay for audit services. On the
other hand, compensating innocent creditors and equity investors
is a worthy goal, especially given their inability to bring to bear
the professional expertise for which auditors are engaged. And
the stakes associated with the quality of financial reporting, at
least in the context of public companies, extend broadly across
capital markets, well beyond the bounds of any particular client's
relationship with its auditor. Effective implementation of federal
securities laws has long been associated with auditors'
independence and objectivity; these qualities, quintessential
requisites for appropriate work, may be undermined by
inadequate incentives. 43
Regardless of the explanation, an intriguing consequence of
these inter-jurisdictional differences is the stress they place on
determining which jurisdiction's law applies to auditors' acts of
alleged malpractice. Just why this is so becomes evident from the
rules adopted in the cases themselves, fully detailed in Shepard's
Note. Kirschner, the New York case discussed above, makes the
availability of in pari delicto turn solely and dispositively on
imputation.44 Shepard fairly characterizes this outcome as
conferring a form of immunity on auditors that is available
regardless of whether an audit failure stemmed from non-
negligent mishap, negligence, or active collusion with fraud-
feasors within the client's organization. 45 Kirschner also ignores a
42. See In re Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 831 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(presenting seven reasons why the Delaware Court of Chancery would be "chary
about following the New York approach").
43. See SEC Codification, supra note 27, § 601.01, 73,251, at 62,894 ("The
Commission has historically considered the independence of the auditors who
examine financial statements filed with the Commission as central to the
effective implementation of the federal securities laws.").
44. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 950-52.
45. See Shepard, supra note 2, at 278.
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central insight reflected in Lybrand, which is the efficiency of
contracting for expert monitoring services that shareholders and
directors lack expertise to provide46 through a corporate-level
engagement that spreads the costs. In contrast, the New Jersey
case, NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP17 decouples the duties
an auditor owes its client from imputation to the client of its
agents' guilty knowledge, holding that negligent (as well as
collusive) failures within the scope of an audit engagement
subject the auditor to liability; imputation would be operative
against the client in suits brought by third-party victims of its
agents' misconduct. Additionally, under NCP, claims against
auditors would be barred when made by shareholders who
engaged in the fraud, knew or should have known of it, or held
stock in blocks of such size to enable them to oversee the firm's
operations. 48 Juxtaposed with NCP and Kirschner, the holding in
the Pennsylvania case turns on another facet of agency doctrine,
which is whether the auditor dealt in material good faith with its
client through the client's agents. In Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Education & Research
Foundation v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC (AHERF),49 the court
held that an auditor who knows or has reason to know that the
financial statements prepared by the client's management are
false also knows or has reason to know that the corporation did
not authorize management's conduct.50 Thus, an auditor who
knows management's conduct to be unauthorized does not deal in
good faith with the client and may not benefit from imputing
management's guilty knowledge to the corporation. However, the
AHERF court equates the position of a negligent auditor who
fails to detect fraud to the position of any third party who deals in
46. Note, Recent Case, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1797, 1802 (2011) ("[Alrguably one
of the major reasons that a corporation would contract for the monitoring
services of outside professional specialists is to exploit their expertise on issues
about which ordinary investors and non-expert directors would otherwise have
neither the requisite knowledge nor resources to make an informed judgment.").
47. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006).
48. Id. at 885-86.
49. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ.
& Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010).
50. Id. at 336.
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good faith with a principal through agents reasonably believed to
have authority to act on the principal's behalf.51
Thus, much turns on which jurisdiction's law applies, 52 a
question addressed extensively by the Delaware Court of
Chancery in American International Group, Inc. v. Greenberg.53
As Shepard notes, the Greenberg court observed that a
corporation's external auditors are not comparable to "genuine
third-parties," 54 implying that auditors should for this purpose be
51. Id. at 335.
52. These stark differences may make it attractive to auditors (and perhaps
law firms) to consider contractual specifications of the law to be applied to
disputes arising out of an engagement. The effectiveness of contractual choice of
law in this context appears to be untested. In general, jurisdictions vary in the
issues that may be governed by a contractual choice of law. See Glenn D. West &
W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability-Can
Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the "Entire" Deal?, 64 Bus. LAW. 999,
1029-31 (2009). Additionally, conventional principles dictate disregarding the
state chosen contractually when the issue is not one the parties could have
resolved contractually when the state chosen lacks any substantial relationship
to the parties or the transaction, or when its application would contravene "a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest ... in the
determination of the particular issue" and which, but for the contractual choice
of law, would be the state of the applicable law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAws § 187(2)(b) (1971). Perhaps also relevant are limitations on
the effectiveness of agreements that prospectively limit liability for malpractice
in the case of lawyers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 54 (2000) (stating that such an agreement is unenforceable). To be
sure, contractual choice of a jurisdiction that confers effective immunity is
technically not identical to a contractual release of liability or to an indemnity
agreement, but the practical consequences may be the same. Separately,
provisions in engagement letters that limit an auditor's liability to the client
may call its independence into question, and thus run counter to the SEC
requirement that an auditor be independent. In the SEC's view, a client's
agreement to indemnify its auditor against loss stemming from the auditor's
own negligence means that the auditor cannot be viewed as independent. SEC
Codification, supra note 27, § 602.02.f.i, 73,274, at 62,968 (observing that
"[s]uch condition must frequently induce a departure from the standards of
objectivity and impartiality which the concept of independence
implies . .. existence of such an agreement may easily lead to the use of less
extensive or thorough procedures than would otherwise be followed"). The
prospect of liability, that is, constitutes "one of the major stimuli to objective and
unbiased consideration of the problems encountered in a particular
engagement." Id.
53. In re Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009), question
certified by Teachers' Ret. Sys. of La. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 998 A.2d
280 (Del. 2010), question answered by Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941
(N.Y. 2010), judgment aff'd, 11 A.3d 228 (Del. 2011).
54. Id. at 831 n.246; see also Shepard, supra note 2, at 315.
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deemed to be among the corporation's own agents, who of course
may not rely on imputation as a basis to defeat their liability to
the corporation.55 If auditors are repositioned as corporate actors
comparable to directors and officers, and the issue is whether
they breached governance-related duties owed to the corporation,
then the applicable law would typically be that of the state of
incorporation, often Delaware in the case of corporations with
public shareholders. To be sure, deeming a corporation's external
auditor to be its agent seems inconsistent with the requirement
that the auditor be independent from the client, but this is not
the focus of the court's analysis. Moreover, although the court
applied settled choice of law principles applicable to tort and
breach of contract claims-which emphasize the physical location
where work was performed-it also noted that, had the plaintiffs
alleged conduct by the auditor-defendant that aided and abetted
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders, "Delaware's
policy interest would ... be paramount" in applying its law to a
"knowing accomplice" in a scheme to injure a Delaware
corporation by acting in cahoots with the corporation's own
agents. 56 Likewise, to the extent a corporation's external auditors
participate in designing its internal control systems, at least that
portion of their work, if adopted by the client, becomes part of the
client's internal mechanisms of accountability and arguably may
implicate policy interests of the state of incorporation.
IV. Determining When a Corporation Is Itself at Fault
As noted above, Shepard advocates decoupling the
availability of the defense of in pari delicto from imputation.
Additionally, she proposes that in pari delicto be limited to
situations in which a corporation itself is at fault for failing to
detect managerial financial fraud. To make this assessment, a
court would focus on whether the corporation's directors failed to
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006) (stating that imputation
is operative "[flor purposes of determining a principal's legal relations with a
third party").
56. In re Am. Int? Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d at 822. This creates the possibility of
d6pegage, that is, the application of multiple jurisdictions' law to different issues
arising out of the same matter.
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implement adequate information-gathering and reporting
systems; failing to do so would breach the directors' duties to the
corporation. 57 The proposal does not take into account the fact
that a board's failure on this score may often, in the context of
internal systems relevant to financial accounting, be preceded by
prior work to design such systems rendered by the corporation's
auditor. This fact differentiates these cases from the Caremark5 8
precedent on which Shepard relies. In Caremark, the control
systems in question concerned compliance with federal
regulations applicable to providers of health care serviceS59;
auditors, who may design internal controls applicable to financial
reporting, are not the focus of the reporting systems required by
Caremark. Moreover, if directors reasonably believe that an
auditor has the requisite expertise to design an internal control
system, corporate law protects their good faith reliance on the
auditor's report, opinion, or statement.60 Additionally, Lybrand,
like more recent authority, defines an auditor's responsibilities to
encompass reporting known deficiencies in internal control
systems.61
For these reasons, it may be difficult to unscramble the
strands of multi-party responsibility when managerial fraud goes
undetected, perhaps sorting the consequences of a design flaw in
an internal control system from subsequent flaws in audit
procedures and distinguishing both from errors made by the
client's directors. To be sure, an externally imposed requirement
that severely restricts the functions that a single audit firm may
serve for any particular client would simplify the sorting, but
such a restriction could also add to costs and complexity and
reduce the fit between a control system and the risks associated
with any particular client if its designer is less informed about
the client. On the other hand, when a client's board (or its audit
committee) disregards an auditor's recommendations concerning
the design of internal systems or the auditor's report of observed
57. See Shepard, supra note 2, at 279, 327-33.
58. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996).
59. Id. at 970.
60. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2011).
61. See Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (N.Y. App. Div.
1939).
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deficiencies in internal controls, it is more plausible that the
directors should bear responsibility for managerial fraud that
subsequently eludes negligent auditors. But even then, the
corporation's shareholders, like its creditors, may not be
especially blameworthy, relying as they did on the auditor's work.
Perhaps adequate responses to auditor malpractice in the
public company context lie beyond the capacity of private law. In
Greenberg, the Delaware court noted that one might both
disapprove of judicial grants of immunity to auditors "while still
having doubt about the public policy utility of exposing audit
firms to uncapped liability for their negligent failure to detect
financial fraud by corporate managers."62 As a more direct
response, the court suggested legislation that couples caps on
auditor liability with indemnity rights that negligent auditors
may pursue against insiders who acted with scienter.63 More
generally, the doctrinal solutions possible through private law
seem likely to be overwhelmed, both by inter-jurisdictional
differences and by the practical consequences of visiting massive
financial liability on an auditor out of proportion to fees charged
(and fees that could plausibly be charged) for audits of public-
company clients. Even were other jurisdictions persuaded by the
argument in Greenberg that the equivocal role of auditors should
be resolved by deeming them the client's agents who owe it duties
governed by the law of the client's state of incorporation,
jurisdictions might well differ on the circumstances under which
those duties are enforceable (and by whom). Thus, perhaps
circumstances have outrun the capacity of private law. A uniform
federal response through ex ante legislation or regulation may be
better suited to the national scope on which major audit firms
and capital markets operate and may better serve the systemic
objective of furthering the integrity of financial reporting, central
62. In re Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 831 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009).
63. Id. The SEC appears to disapprove of engagement terms that grant
such indemnity rights. See SEC Office of the Chief Accountant, Application of
the Commission's Rules on Auditor Independence: Frequently Asked Questions,
Question 4 (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/ocafa
qaudindl21304.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (noting that the clause "other
matters" in engagement letters stating that the SEC registrant would release,
indemnify, or hold harmless from liability or costs resulting from knowing
misrepresentations by management would impair the audit firm's
independence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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as that is to the operation of information-driven markets for
investment securities. A uniform federal response might also
focus on remedying any problematic features in the structure of
audit firms and the services they offer that compromise the
efficacy of auditing and thus the integrity of financial reporting.
Just as federal securities law and regulation occupy much legal
space surrounding public companies, so might these additional
issues underlying auditors' accountability be brought into the
fold.
Displacing the operation of private law doctrines through
regulation is far from unprecedented. In what now may feel like
the distant past, prior to the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933,64 the private law of contract and tort did not "condone
misrepresentation in the sale of securities."65 However, the fit
was not optimal because "the common-law liability was not
consciously and especially moulded for the flotation of securities,"
developed as it was "largely in connection with other
transactions" and then "applied piecemeal to securities cases as
they came before the courts."66 Only rarely did courts articulate
any underlying rationale or policy 67 and often factual variations
overcame any policy underlying liability.68 Among the
accomplishments of the Securities Act was a regulatory design
(including civil liability provisions) that stemmed from focused
consideration of the requisites of protecting investors in public
corporations. The Act, as federal legislation that preempted state
law, also replaced jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction legal diversity with
uniformity. 69 Likewise, in the context of public companies, the
import of managerial fraud when an auditor is also at fault
warrants a uniform answer.
64. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
65. Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227,
227 (1933).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 228.
69. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 41 (2000) ("It would be difficult to think of any area of the law
where uniformity is so essential.").
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